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A substantial portion of contemporary public discourse and social interaction is conducted over online 
social media platforms, such as Facebook, YouTube, Reddit, and TikTok. Accordingly, these platforms 
form a core component of the ​digital public sphere​ which, although subject to private ownership, 
constitute a digital i​nfrastructural resource​ that is open to members of the public. As private entities, 
platforms can set their own rules for participation, in the form of terms of service, community standards, 
and other guidelines. The content moderation systems deployed by such platforms to ensure that content 
posted on the platform complies with these terms, conditions, and standards have the potential to 
influence and shape ​public discourse​ by mediating what members of the public are able to see, hear, and 
say online. Over time, these rules may have a norm-setting effect, shaping the conduct and expectations 
of users about what “acceptable” discourse looks like. Thus, the design and implementation of content 
moderation systems have a powerful impact on the ​freedom of expression ​of users​ ​and​ ​their ​access to 
dialogic interaction ​on the platform. With great power comes great responsibility: the increasing trend 
towards the adoption of algorithmic content moderation systems that have a questionable track record 
as regards their ability to safeguard freedom of expression gives rise to urgent concerns on the need to 
ensure that content moderation is regulated in a manner that safeguards and fosters robust public 
discourse in the online sphere.  
This policy brief was developed with the contributions of an interdisciplinary team of experts from the 
fields of law, political science, sociology, and engineering. It aims to inform legislators and policymakers 
of the risks posed by the proliferation of algorithmic content moderation and the need for a more 
proactive regulatory approach by the states towards the governance of content moderation systems that 
are deployed by online platforms providing digital infrastructure for public discourse. It highlights an 
“information gap” that prevents regulators from evaluating the impact of content moderation on freedom 
of expression and an “accountability gap” that arises through the absence of effective redress 
mechanisms by which users are able to challenge violations of freedom of expression.  
The policy brief concludes by proposing strategies for bridging these information and accountability gaps 
by means of: 
Introducing enforceable statutory obligations​ which require platforms to:  
⎼ Provide information on the design, implementation, and impact of their content moderation 
systems through periodic reports and fundamental rights impact assessments (designed to address 
the information gap). 
⎼ Increase the capacity for individual redress through effective complaints and redress mechanisms 
(designed to address the accountability gap). 
Establishing an Ombudsperson​ who is authorized to supervise the protection of freedom of expression on 
online platforms.  










Platforms as digital infrastructure 
A social media platform constitutes an online digital space, which enables and facilitates communication 
and interaction among a multiplicity of persons and/or entities by providing the necessary technical 
infrastructure and tools.​1​ Accordingly, platforms give rise to a community of users who use this 
infrastructure to engage in public discourse by means of posting and sharing diverse types of content, 
thereby facilitating civic participation in addressing issues of public concern.​2​ Political discussion and 
news media consumption, two substantial components of the social media experience, are particularly 
integral to civic participation​3​. Social media platforms’ openness to the public, high number of users, and 
influence on contemporary social, political, and cultural discourse make it possible to describe them as a 
key component of the ​digital public sphere​.​4​ Despite their importance for public discourse, platforms are 
owned and administered by private companies who exercise substantial discretion in determining the 
terms and conditions that govern user activity and behaviour on the platform. As platforms’ user bases 
grow (to over 2.7 billion users in the case of Facebook), so do concerns over the influence of private 
decision-making on shaping public discourse. Thus, governments that support deliberative discussion, 
self-determination, and inclusive civic participation in the digital public sphere have a duty to facilitate 
and foster healthy and robust public discourse by ensuring greater fairness and transparency in platform 
governance. 
Content moderation and freedom of expression  
Content moderation in particular has considerable potential to shape and influence the nature and scope 
of the discourse taking place over a platform.​5​ Content moderation, as it concerns us here, is the process 
by which platforms shape community participation, prevent abuse, and ensure compliance with terms of 
service and community standards that they define.​6​ Platform owners and/or administrators are able to 
engage in content moderation by means of exercising their rights of ownership of the platform 
infrastructure and authority over its use​7​. It is the implementation of those terms, standards, and 
guidelines that are the single means by which rules are experienced by ordinary users.  
Content moderation can come in many forms. On Facebook, a post can be reported by another user for 
violation of specific rules, an automated algorithm can spot potentially illegal content before it is shared, 
or in extreme cases, a user can be banned completely, making the platform virtually inaccessible to that 
user. Notwithstanding the variety of forms, content moderation has one clear impact: a private entity 
1 Definition of social media platforms developed by Valentina Golunova and Sunimal Mendis within the framework of the Research 
Sprint on ‘AI and Platforms Governance’.  
2 On the notion of infrastructure see James Grimmelmann, ‘The Virtues of Moderation’ (2015) 17 Yale Journal of Law and 
Technology 42, at p.52 citing Brett M. Frischmann, ​Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources​ (OUP 2012). 
3 See Dhavan V. Shah et al, ‘Information and Expression in a Digital Age: Modeling Internet Effects on Civic Participation’ (2005) 32 
Communication Research 531. 
4 The term ‘digital public sphere’ is of relatively recent origin. It is envisioned as,“[...] a communicative sphere provided or supported 
by online or social media –from websites to social network sites, weblogs and micro-blogs – where participation is open and freely 
available to everybody who is interested, where matters of common concern can be discussed, and where proceedings are visible to 
all.” Mike S. Schäfer, ‘The Digital Public Sphere’,​ ​in Gianpietro Mazzoleni et al.(eds.), ​The International Encyclopedia of Political 
Communication​ (Wiley Blackwell 2015) 322.. 
5 See Adam Kramer, Jamie Guillory and Jeffrey Hancock, ‘Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion Through 
Social Networks’ (2014) 111 ​Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA​ 8788. 
6 See Grimmelmann (n 2) at p. 47 and definition of “Content Moderation” developed by Phillip Darius and Wei Yan within the 
framework of the Research Sprint on “AI and Platform Governance”..  
7 Although it is noted that  in some contexts, this freedom is theoretically limited and must not infringe on the users’ individual 








makes a decision concerning an individual’s ability to access and to participate in the public discourse 
taking place over the platform and interacting with a community of users.  
Content moderation therefore has significant implications for the protection of freedom of expression in 
the digital public sphere. While pursuing a legitimate objective of preventing abuse by taking down illicit 
or harmful content and ensuring compliance with the platforms’ terms of service and community 
standards, ​inaccuracies and inefficiencies​ ​in the design and implementation​ of the content moderation 
system can negatively impact freedom of expression ​inter alia ​in the following ways:  
● Wrongful removal/flagging of legitimate content that impedes free-speech. 
● Wrongful banning of users/disabling of accounts that prevents individuals from accessing and 
participating in the public discourse taking place on the platform.  
What is even more troubling is that in certain instances, content that is ​not​ deemed illicit or harmful 
under prevailing law can be removed and user accounts disabled on grounds of non-compliance with the 
platform’s terms of service or community standards.  
As exemplified below, the recent trend towards the deployment of algorithmic content moderation (ACM) 
systems exacerbates the negative impact of content moderation on freedom of expression.   
The proliferation of algorithmic content moderation systems 
 
Causes 
Many online networks have turned to computational solutions that help manage content contributed by 
users. These systems use algorithms for the classification of content to support platform moderation. The 
algorithms may classify content as illegal or potentially harmful, or they may be used for the 
identification of specified content, e.g. copyright-protected material. The classification of content can 
then be used for automated deletion or blocking, or as a support tool for human moderators (i.e. 








The automated classification of content is a huge challenge. Even the recognition of predefined material 
(e.g. online music) is a complex task due to the large amounts of data, the necessary availability of large 
databases, issues of interoperability, and the requirement to deal with modified content, e.g. truncated or 
noisy files. The classification of illegal online content or of potentially harmful content also poses 
considerable technical challenges as it targets a more semantic level of the content, i.e. its meaning. 
These systems use different algorithms, including so-called artificially intelligent techniques. They range 
from rather simple schemes that focus on the identification of key words to more elaborate systems that 
use deep learning methods to identify postings with potentially illegal content based on large sets of 
examples previously classified by human experts. Despite efforts to make these systems more perceptive 
of nuance, most of them remain context-blind and therefore produce highly inaccurate results.​8  
The current state-of-the-technology is far from the capabilities and recognition rate of humans in many 
domains. Existing methods can only achieve partial recognition. This is unsurprising given that the 
inter-expert agreement rate for classifying online content varies significantly. Most algorithmic methods 
only work on single contributions, such as a single post, and cannot properly deal with the overall 
context of postings, such as a chat history, its news context, timely aspects or cultural connotations. 
Typically, classification algorithms therefore can only deliver a rough classification quality with relatively 
large numbers of false positives and false negatives. 
The increased use of automated content moderation can be attributed to several causes. This includes 
the surge in the volume of content that is posted and shared over online platforms due to increasing 
numbers of users and user activity, and as we have noted, the increasing availability of new artificial 
intelligence technology that is perceived to be more speedy, efficient, and cost-effective than human 
moderators. 
However, the surge in the use of ACM can also be, in part, attributed to more stringent regulatory 
frameworks that impose​ greater pressure on platforms to monitor and filter content.​ Traditionally, 
platforms were either shielded from liability for third-party content (e.g. Section 230 of the US 
Communication Decency Act​9​) or held liable in accordance with a ‘negligence-based’ approach, whereby 
liability was imputed only where they failed to take down illegal or harmful content once they were 
made aware of its existence on the platform (e.g. Arts. 14 & 15 of the EU e-Commerce Directive​10​ and Art. 
1195 of the Chinese Civil Code​11​).  
Nevertheless, at present, there is a ​global shift towards increasing the degree of liability ​imposed on 
platforms for hosting illegal/harmful content as a means of compelling platforms to take a more 
proactive role in combating the surge of illegal content online. This shift can be described as being 
aimed towards coercing or co-opting platform owners into regulating content shared on their platforms 
by third parties on behalf of the state.​12​ At the extreme end of the spectrum of this shift are laws that 
impose strict liability regimes. For instance, under Article 17 of the EU C-DSM Directive​13​, online 
content-sharing service providers are held directly liable for copyright-infringing content posted on their 
8 See Tarleton Gillespie, ‘Content Moderation, AI, and the Question of Scale’ (2020) 7 Big Data & Society 1. 
9 ​Communications Act of 1934​ at ​47 U.S.C.​ ​§ 230​ (promulgated under the Telecommunications Act of 1996).  
10  Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information 
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L 178/1 (hereinafter “EU e-Commerce 
Directive”). 
11 The Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China, as the first law named after the Code, was promulgated on May 28, 2020 and 
will come into force on January 1, 2021 (hereinafter “the Chinese Civil Code”, CCC). 
12 See Jack M Balkin, ‘Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation’ 
(2018) 51 UC Davis Law Review 1149, at p.1153. 
13 Directive 2019/790/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the 








platforms by third parties. A strict liability regime is also envisioned in the Proposed Regulation on 
Terrorist Content.​14​ The need to avoid the risk of incurring liability can serve as a strong incentive for 
platforms to deploy ACM systems in order to ensure proactive detection and removal of illegal/harmful 
content. 
The deployment of ACM is also induced due to ​the lack of the ‘Good Samaritan’ protection​. For example, 
under Section 230 of the US Communications Decency Act, platforms cannot be held liable for content 
which they take down voluntarily provided they do so in good faith. Importantly, platforms are equally 
protected against liability for illegal content which they had undertaken to tackle, but failed to detect or 
remove.​15​ However, the ‘Good Samaritan’ protection is absent in the legislative framework of other 
jurisdictions, including the EU​16​ and China.​17​ Voluntary moderation efforts can be regarded as an 
indication that platforms do not store content in a mere passive and automatic manner and lead to the 
waiver of the liability exemption. As the cost of a single mistake can be too high, platforms implement 
ACM systems, which are believed to surpass relevant human capabilities. For example, the Good 
Samaritan gap between China and the US triggered America’s National Security review of TikTok. — see 
TikTok Case Study. 
Platforms are also incentivised to increase the efficiency of their content-filtering activities through the 
imposition of ​monetary penalties​. For instance, the German NetzDG Law​18​ foresees significant fines of up 
to 50 million euros. In a similar vein, Article 68 of the Chinese Cybersecurity Law​19​ envisages economic 
fines, suspension of business, and monetary penalties for persons in charge. The introduction of such 
stringent regimes induce platforms to resort to ACM as a more effective means of compliance.  
In addition to more stringent policies, the increased use of ACM can also be attributed to other factors. 
Apart from a general rise in user-generated online content, one of the many effects of the ​global 
COVID-19 pandemic​ was the inability of employees to work from their office. For large platforms, such as 
Facebook or YouTube, that perform ​ex post​ content moderation in-house, this meant that tasks that 
would normally be done by human moderators were performed by automated algorithms in the interim. 
These unusual circumstances provide a unique view into the effects of increased ACM. Despite 
advancements in the capacity and sophistication of ACM technology, our research leads us to conclude 
that increased use of ACM without substantial human oversight results in higher levels of wrongful 
removal and disabling of legitimate content — see​ YouTube Case Study. 
14 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content 
online (COM(2018) 640, 12 September 2018). 
15 See Aleksandra Kuczerawy, ‘The EU Commission on Voluntary Monitoring: Good Samaritan 2.0 or Good Samaritan 0.5?’ (CITIP 
blog, 24 April 2018) 
<​https://www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/blog/the-eu-commission-on-voluntary-monitoring-good-samaritan-2-0-or-good-samaritan-0-5/
> accessed 2 October 2020. 
16 For instance, Articles 14 and 15 of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain 
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic 
commerce) provide a “safe harbour” for intermediaries who ‘host’ content (as opposed to merely caching or transmitting content) 
only on the basis that they comply with notice-and-take-down obligations. 
17 Although the Articles 1194-1197 of the Chinese Civil Code (CCC), on the basis of Article 36 of the previous Tort Law, integrate the 
“counter-notice” provisions of the Articles 42 and 43 of the Electronic Commerce Law, the Article 1195 (CCC) still stipulates that 
after receiving the notice, the ISPs shall promptly transmit the notice to the relevant network users, and take necessary measures 
based on the preliminary evidence of infringement and the type of service. 
18 German Network Enforcement Act [Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz] ​BGBl. I S. 3352​ (2017) updated as ​BGBl. I S. 1328, 1360​ (2020).  
19 The Cyber Security Law of the People's Republic of China was enacted on November 7, 2016 and implemented on June 1, 2017. 










The increased reliance on ACM has created a wellspring of effects for the social media ecosystem. The 
core challenge of creating an ACM system is to strike an appropriate balance between protecting users 
against exposure to objectionable (i.e. illegal or harmful) content and ensuring that users’ freedom of 
expression is adequately safeguarded. An insufficiently effective system might allow an unacceptable 
level of objectionable content to remain on the platform, potentially exposing users to considerable 
harm, offence, or risks to safety. On the flipside, however, an overzealous ACM system may unfairly 
remove legitimate content, creating a chilling effect with respect to what is seen as acceptable. Here we 
examine the latter concern and identify three primary limitations of algorithmic moderation technology 
that negatively impact on safeguarding users’ freedom of expression.   
First, ​ACM systems are context-blind.​ While capable of detecting certain words and expressions, they 
interpret them as mere strings of data rather than components of human lexicon. For example, an ACM 
tool targeting obscenity online cannot ascertain whether an individual used strong vocabulary to incite 
hatred or to raise an essential matter of public interest. The ignorance of nuance can threaten forms of 
online expression that contribute to important public debates.​20  
Second, ​ACM is significantly language-dependent​. Most systems powered by natural language processing 
are only trained to process texts in English and a few other frequently used languages. This makes their 
accuracy rate much lower than when they are deployed for analysing texts written in more uncommon 
languages.​21​ ​Furthermore, most platforms are unable to review automatically flagged materials written in 
less common languages as they lack moderators fluent in them.​22​ ​As a result, the roll-out of ACM can 
impair the freedom of expression of certain language speakers, especially those belonging to linguistic 
minorities for which only relatively small training-datasets are available. 
Third, ​ACM is incapable of processing certain types of files​. Most ACM tools are only able to process 
conventional types of files, such as text images and videos. However, they are still incapable of ensuring 
adequate analysis of other viral types of content, including memes and GIFs.​23​ Due to the low accuracy of 
ACM, such materials may either remain undetected or be subject to over-removal. The limited 
capabilities of ACM tools can therefore give rise to an asymmetry among various forms of online 
expression. 
Closing the information gap 
People can reasonably disagree about how to balance freedom of speech with other interests and how 
these different priorities should be weighed. All can agree, however, that this is not a decision for 
platforms to take by themselves. What is needed instead is informed, inclusive debate among all 
stakeholders, backed up by responsive policymaking, to ensure that all perspectives are heard.  
Platforms have begun to take such steps, at least internally. Facebook has a large public policy team 
which engages with experts and other key stakeholders around the world in order to develop its 
community standards and assess how well they work in practice. It also analyses user appeals to get a 
20 Otto Preminger-Institut v Austria [1994] App. No. 13470/87, para 49; Marina v Romania [2020] App. No. 50469/14, para 74;                                       
Gündüz v Turkey [2003] App. No. 25071/97, para 37;  
21 See Natasha Duarte and others, ‘Mixed Messages? The Limits of Automated Social Media Content Analysis’ in Proceedings of the                                       
1st Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency (PMLR 2018). 
22 See Olivia Solon, ‘Facebook’s Failure in Myanmar is the Work of a Blundering Toddler’ (the Guardian, 16 August 2018) 
<​http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/aug/16/facebook-myanmar-failure-blundering-toddler​> accessed 25 October 2020. 
23 See Bertie Vidgen and others, ‘Challenges and Frontiers in Abusive Content Detection’ in Proceedings of the Third Workshop on 








sense of the types of content, which users are most likely to believe should remain on the platform. It 
has also established an independent Oversight Board which will adjudicate on individual cases in order 
to develop principles that can, in turn, be used to reshape its community standards, and even hear 
appeals from users of other platforms.​24 
Such steps are welcome, but they remain in large part a closed loop, with little ability for ordinary users 
to engage in the process. And although Facebook has for several years been releasing high-level data 
about its moderation of various kinds of content in the form of Transparency Reports (see Facebook Case 
Study), this information lacks sufficient granularity for outside researchers to understand how and why 
content moderation decisions are made. On the individual level, the amount of information provided to 
users to enable them to understand why a particular piece of content has been removed varies 
considerably among different platforms (see table below).  
 
KEY FEATURES OF APPEALS PROCEDURES 
Summary of key features of appeals procedures of four large social media platforms  
and the online discussion forum of the Austrian newspaper, Der Standard (see Der Standard Case Study) 
 
 
This information gap — between what platforms know and what individual users, regulators, and other 
stakeholders and interested parties, such as scientific researchers, know — urgently needs to be closed. 
Only when all stakeholders have access to sufficient data can informed and inclusive debate take place 
about how content moderation systems ought to work and the capacity of ACM systems’ fitness for 
safeguarding freedom of expression be assessed.  
24 At the same time it is worth mentioning that Facebook aims for a single set of globally applicable standards. 
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Closing the accountability gap 
In addition to the information gap we have also identified an accountability gap that arises from the 
absence of effective and transparent complaints and redress mechanisms which enable users to 
challenge wrongful removal of legitimate content and disabling access. 
Not all legislative instruments targeted at regulating platforms explicitly require platforms to establish 
effective complaints and redress mechanisms. On the other hand, those that do impose such an 
obligation do not incorporate adequate measures to ensure the effectiveness of the complaints and 
redress mechanism. Furthermore, the legal enforceability of these obligations are unclear.   
The EU C-DSM requires online content-sharing service providers to put in place “an effective and 
expeditious complaint and redress mechanism”. However, the enforceability of this obligation is 
uncertain, as no liability is apportioned for non-compliance. In the US, s. 512 (g) of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)​25​ provides for a system of “counter-notice” by means of which a user is 
able to challenge the removal or disabling of content. However, the burden of establishing the 
lawfulness of the content is left squarely on the shoulders of the user, something that all users may not 
have the resources or expertise to perform. On the other hand, submitting a counter-notice can itself 
expose the user to an infringement law-suit; a risk many users will be unwilling to take.​26  
An effective complaints and redress mechanism would constitute a powerful tool for safeguarding 
freedom of expression on online platforms, as it would afford users a means by which to challenge 
wrongful censorship of free-speech without incurring the costs and risks associated with court 
procedures. Thus, closing the accountability gap requires the introduction of positive and enforceable 
obligations on platforms to provide such mechanisms and adequate regulatory supervision to ensure 
their efficacy. To take China’s online content moderation as an example, some ministry-level regulatory 
documents that are legally binding require platforms to “practice social responsibility and industrial 
self-discipline”, as well as “improving the mechanisms for screening malicious reports and dealing with 
complaints in a timely and fair manner”,​27​ but it is unclear whether the obligation should be applicable to 
ACM systems. China also called for the “net norms” as the self-governance instruments of platforms in 
the main ministry-level internet-regulating documents, which encouraged most platforms to adopt 
complaints and redress mechanisms.​28 
Proposals  
We propose the following measures with the objectives of bridging the information and accountability 
gaps exemplified above and of safeguarding freedom of expression on online platforms that are open to 
public participation and interaction.   
25 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (USA) 17 U.S. Code § 512 (hereinafter “DMCA”). 
26 DMCA § 512(g)(2)(C). 
27 Arts 14 and 15 of the Internet User Public Account Information Services Management Provisions issued by Cyberspace 
Administration of China (Promulgated in 2017). See the English translation of the document at 
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/public-accounts/​. 
28 For instance, in the WeChat Public Account Platform, when the relevant content is suspected of violating the law and is 









The goal of these proposals is to strengthen the character of publicly accessible online platforms as 
digital spaces for robust and healthy public discourse by:  
⎼ Urging regulators to take a more proactive role in supervising and regulating content 
moderation by privately owned platforms, especially in relation to the protection of freedom of 
expression (this is contrasted with the existing approach, whereby states favour self-regulation 
by platforms with minimal public supervision).  
⎼ Requiring greater openness and transparency from platforms with regard to their content 
moderation processes, particularly where ACM systems are deployed. 
⎼ Enhancing the accountability of the content moderation process by empowering users to 
challenge wrongful take-down of content which may violate users’ freedom of expression.  
Our proposals consist of two principal layers: 
Introduction of ​enforceable statutory obligations ​requiring platforms to establish effective 
complaints and redress mechanisms (accountability gap), periodic reporting requirements, and 
fundamental rights impact assessments (FRIAs) (information gap). 
Establishment of an ​Ombudsperson,​29​ ​a public authority vested with powers to supervise and 
assess the safeguarding of freedom of expression by platforms and to review decisions delivered 
by the platform pursuant to the complaints and redress process, for violations of freedom of 
expression.  
29 The office of the Ombudspersonis contrasted with existing private oversight mechanisms that have been established by 
platforms, the best example of which is the Facebook Oversight Board. We believe that entrusting the supervision of content 








Proposals for closing the accountability gap 
Enforceable statutory obligations 
We propose the introduction of a statutory obligation to establish and maintain ​effective complaints & 
redress mechanisms​. This obligation would apply to all online platforms that host content provided by 
members of the public. Failure to comply with the obligation would expose the platform to 
state-imposed sanctions and/or administrative penalties imposed by the Ombudsperson. 
The statutory obligation would require the platform to ensure that their appeals and redress mechanism 
incorporates ​inter alia ​the following features: 
✓ Duty to notify users of removal/disablement of content posted by them (including “shadow 
banning​30​”). 
✓ Consideration and determination of complaints to be carried out by human reviewers. 
✓ Reviewers to be provided with adequate training and resources to consider and determine 
complaints.  
✓ Right of users and other interested parties to be heard in determining the complaint.  
✓ Complaints to be scrutinized and decision delivered and (if applicable) redress provided within a 
defined time-frame that is determined in a manner that balances the interests of platform 
owners and users.  
✓ Duty to give reasons for decision. 
While acknowledging that compliance with this obligation would impose additional financial and 
administrative burdens that could be onerous for small and medium-sized platforms, we believe that 
they are necessary and proportionate for ensuring the protection of freedom of expression. Given the 
character of these platforms as digital public infrastructures, it is reasonable to require them to put in 
place minimal safeguards to ensure that content moderation is carried out in a manner that safeguards 
due process and user rights and interests.   
Ombudsperson 
The Ombudsperson will be authorised to ​review decisions delivered by platforms​ pursuant to the 
complaints mechanism, where the aggrieved party is of the view that the decision violates their freedom 
of expression. In such a case, the Ombudsperson will review the decision for possible violations of 
freedom of expression and will deliver a ruling that is final and binding on all parties. The 
Ombudspersonwill be authorised to order restitution (e.g. content to be restored, account to be 
unblocked) ​and​,​ ​where necessary, the payment of damages/compensation to the aggrieved party.  
Furthermore, where the human reviewers dealing with complaints are uncertain about determining the 
freedom of expression issues that arise through a complaint, they will be able to consult with the 
Ombudsperson who will provide advice and guidance on determining those issues.  
A platform’s failure to comply with a ruling delivered by the Ombudsperson will expose it to 
administrative penalties and/or legal sanctions. Any party who is dissatisfied with a ruling issued by the 
Ombudsperson will have the possibility of appealing the ruling to an appropriate national or regional 
court.  
It is anticipated that this measure would​ ​ensure that determinations on potential violations of freedom of 
expression are not exclusively left to private entities​,​ but are subject to oversight by a public authority 
who will be qualified to engage in a comprehensive analysis of the legal issues involved. Moreover, it 
30 Shadow banning refers to the blocking of a user or content posted by a user, from the platform in a manner that does not make it 








would resolve the information asymmetry problem which refers to the absence of adequate knowledge 
and skills on the part of human reviewers employed by platforms to correctly assess the legal issues 
relating to the violation of freedom of expression. 
Proposals for closing the information gap 
In addition to the general obligation proposed above we propose the introduction of two additional 
enforceable statutory obligations that would apply to platforms that are considered to have a particularly 
significant impact on public discourse, e.g. by means of catering to a large community of users, attracting 
a large public audience, or hosting a large volume of content.  
The determination of the exact criteria based on which these obligations will become applicable should 
be left to policy-makers and regulators. However, existing legal provisions differentiate levels of liability 
based on factors, such as number of monthly unique visitors​31​, annual turnover of the platform​32​, and so 
on. It is also possible that not-for-profit educational and scientific platforms and open-source software 
developing platforms will be exempted from these specific obligations taking into account the financial 
and administrative burdens that they entail. The objective of this limitation is to exempt smaller and 
less-financially profitable platforms from the financial and administrative commitment involved in 
complying with the statutory obligations proposed below. On the other hand, it is reasonable to require 
large platforms that profit from the public interaction and discourse taking place on the online 
infrastructure provided by them to take reasonable and proportionate measures to ensure that the 
content moderation systems deployed by them safeguard user interests and freedom of expression to an 
adequate extent.  
Enforceable statutory obligations 
First, we propose an enforceable statutory obligation to provide ​periodic (annual/biannual) reports ​to the 
Ombudsperson on the number of complaints received by platform and number of reinstatements carried 
out. This proposal is inspired by Section 2 of the NetzDG Law which introduces a similar half-yearly 
reporting obligation. It is envisioned that this reporting obligation would provide greater transparency to 
the complaints and redress process and enable regulators and members of the public to monitor and 
evaluate the accuracy of the content moderation systems and the efficacy of the complaints and redress 
mechanism.  
The report should ​inter alia​: 
✓ Categorise complaints according to the type of action that was challenged (e.g. removal, 
disablement of access), reason for action-taken (e.g. hate-speech, copyright infringement) and 
whether complaint was made by an individual user or an organization. 
✓ Categorise reasons for reinstatement (e.g. human error, error on the part of the AI system, 
decision overturned by Ombudsperson on appeal). 
✓ Indicate the time-span within which removal/disablement of content was made, complaint was 
received, decision provided, and reinstatement carried out. 
✓ Indicate the number of decisions that were appealed to the Ombudsperson. 
Second, we propose an enforceable statutory obligation to ​provide an annual FRIA​ to assess the impact 
of the deployment of ACM on freedom of expression. The aim of the FRIA is to enable regulators and 









members of the public to evaluate and supervise the measures taken by a platform for safeguarding 
freedom of expression. It is inspired by the Data Protection Impact Assessment that was introduced 
under Article 35 of the EU GDPR​33​. Such an impact assessment would be especially relevant for assessing 
the impact of new technologies, such as automated processing systems, to fundamental rights and 
freedoms.​34 
The FRIA should ​inter alia ​incorporate information on the following aspects: 
✓ How do the community standards/ terms and conditions of the platform safeguard freedom of 
expression? 
✓ Description of ACM systems used, the purpose of the use, and the mode of implementation.  
✓ Assessment of the necessity and proportionality of employing ACM systems in relation to the 
stated purpose.  
✓ Identification of the risks of AMC systems to freedom of expression of users and measures 
employed to mitigate risks.  
✓ Description of the appeals procedure and remedial measures provided to users.  
✓ Description of training and resources provided to human reviewers (dealing with complaints) to 
carry out a comprehensive legal analysis of the freedom of expression issues involved.  
Ombudsperson 
Regarding the second layer of our proposals on closing the information gap, the Ombudsperson will be 
authorized to: 
⎼ Receive and assess the periodic reports and FRIAs submitted by platforms and issue 
recommendations for improving content moderation systems and complaints and redress 
procedures with the objective of better protecting freedom of expression.  
⎼ Impose administrative penalties for failure to comply with statutory obligations or to implement 
recommendations.   
⎼ Maintain a website that is available to the public where summaries of periodic reports and FRIAs 
provided by platforms are published as well as rulings or summaries of rulings delivered by the 
Ombudsperson in the exercise of his powers of review, which are redacted as required by law 
(e.g. to protect personal information or commercially-sensitive information). 
⎼ Provide guidance and advice to platforms on their statutory duties and in ensuring that their 
content moderation systems comply with statutory requirements.  
33 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, OJ 2016 L 
119/1(hereinafter EU GDPR) 
34 Our proposal has been inspired by Janssen's proposal for the introduction of an FRIA for automated decision making with 
personal data. See Heleen L Janssen, ‘An Approach for a Fundamental Rights Impact Assessment to Automated Decision-Making’ 










A platform’s failure to comply with statutory obligations or to implement a recommendation delivered by 
the Ombudsperson will expose it to legal sanctions and/or administrative penalties imposed by the 
Ombudsperson. Any party who is dissatisfied with a ruling issued by the Ombudsperson will have the 
possibility of appealing the ruling to an appropriate national or regional court.  
It is anticipated that close supervision of the fitness of the content moderation systems (particularly ACM 
systems) by the Ombudsperson and periodic evaluation thereof will incentivize and compel platforms to 
ensure that those systems are designed and calibrated to avoid violations to freedom of expression 
through the removal or disabling of legitimate content.  
The publication of summaries of the periodic reports and FRIAs as well as rulings (or summaries thereof) 
on a publicly available website by the Ombudsperson is expected to ensure the availability of 
information on the efficacy and accuracy of content moderation to stakeholders, interested parties (e.g. 
scientific researchers), and the wider public. It is hoped that this would contribute towards facilitating 
informed, society-wide debate on user freedoms and the calibration of content moderation systems to 















YouTube, the largest video hosting platform on the internet, has been the target of recent criticism by 
governments and users concerning their use of algorithms. Politicians have accused YouTube of political 
bias, algorithmic reinforcement of extremist views by recommendation systems, and the circulation of 
misinformation, while content creators, some of whom rely on revenue from videos as a main source of 
income, have strongly censured the platform for their lack of accountability on decisions of removal. The 
majority of these decisions are made by automated algorithms and in the wake of the pandemic and the 
absence of human moderators, YouTube relied more heavily on these algorithms. 
Through numbers made available in YouTube’s transparency reports and conversation with policy 
representatives, we were able to investigate the effects of increased ACM more closely. As we see in the 
table below, over 11 million videos were removed in quarter 2 of 2020, almost double the number 
removed in the first quarter. From the drastic increase in removals and the disproportionate increase in 
reinstatements, we inferred that the ​algorithms are simply not able to perform as well as human 
moderators​. This hypothesis was confirmed by a YouTube representative. Despite advances in the 
technological capability of automated algorithms, we conclude that more automated moderation without 
a human in the loop is not the solution.  
Table: Removals, appeals, and reinstatements before and during the coronavirus pandemic  
(Data: Google Transparency Report) 
Facebook Case Study 
Content moderation on Facebook: what do we know? 
Calls for Facebook to standardise and improve its content moderation have naturally been accompanied 
by demands to know whether and to what extent Facebook is actually doing so. Facebook’s community 
standards transparency reports, which provide data stretching as far back as late 2017, provide basic 
information about the scope and type of violating content that it “actioned” — i.e., removed — from its 
main platform as well as from its popular subsidiary Instagram. More specifically, the data provided is as 
follows: 
Prevalence​ — showing in absolute terms the volume of problematic content in a variety of categories; 
however, full longitudinal data is only available for the “Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity” and “Violent 
and Graphic Content” categories. For other categories, Facebook claims that either the volume of 
violating content seen by users is either too small to create a robust sample, or simply that data cannot 
be estimated because “our prevalence measurement is slowly expanding to cover more languages and 
regions”. In still other cases, the data is reported for a single quarter, e.g. “we estimate that fake accounts 












Q4 2019  5887021  1,81%  19,6% 
Q1 2020  6111008  2,72%  24,7% 
Q2 2020  11401696  2,85%  49,4% 
 




Content actioned​ — showing the volume of content what was “actioned” i.e. removed by Facebook, for 
each quarter. 
Proactive rate ​— showing the percentage of content that was found and flagged by Facebook before 
being reported by users for each quarter. In almost all cases this “finding and flagging” is done 
automatically using rules-based and/or AI detection systems. 
Appealed content ​— showing in absolute terms how much content that was removed was then appealed 
by users, for each quarter. 
Restored content ​— showing in absolute terms how much content was restored, either without an appeal 
(i.e. following internal review) or after a successful appeal. 
Below are graphs showing the content actioned, proactive rate, appealed content, and restored content 
for hate speech, an especially challenging category of content with respect to enforcement and the 
balancing of users’ rights and expectations. Unfortunately, the data provided in the transparency reports 





There are undoubtedly several things we can learn from the data that Facebook releases publicly. Basic 
longitudinal data highlights several trends with respect to the overall prevalence of content (at least for 








speculate about what underlies these trends, such as the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the rise 
of automated flagging technology. Yet there are several questions that an interested user would be 
unable to answer without the points of contact that the authors were able to draw upon. First, there is a 
lot of missing data, particularly with respect to prevalence, with only two of the ten content categories 
offering full longitudinal data. Second, the format that the data is presented in prevents more granular 
analysis without laborious manual recreation of the data in a manipulable format. Third and most 
importantly, the reports say little about ​how and why ​decisions get made in the way that they do. As a 
recent piece by the EFF argues,​35​ “true transparency must provide context”, and there is little context in 
the transparency reports regarding the basis on which individual decisions are made. Nor is information 
available about the process of content moderation itself, the use of automated technology, besides that 
which can be inferred from the above (let alone how such technology works), or the background and 
location of content moderators. Recent changes made to Facebook’s Community Standards​36​ ​can be 
found on its website, but again, ​how and why​ these changes were made is not made clear — and nor is 
the relationship between the development and iteration of standards and how they are enforced 
apparent.  
Finally, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic appears to have been stark. Facebook effectively 
suspended its appeals process as mass lockdowns went into effect given the limited resource available, 
explaining the drastic drop in appeals, though it appears to have restored much more content outside of 
the appeal process, which more than makes up for the previous quarter’s total. Of course, it is impossible 
to assess the accuracy of the decision to restore content in this way. 
TikTok Case Study 
TikTok/Douyin per se is a split product. Since 2019, ByteDance has been separating TikTok International 
from Douyin (TikTok’s Chinese version),​37​ but US TikTok has still been at the core of the debate on 
trans-border data flow and ACM in the “Splinternet”.  At the beginning, when ByteDance was a start-up in 
China, Douyin was successful in shaping its business model with its core advantaged algorithms, and this 
model originated from that of ByteDance’s Toutiao, a news app, which controls algorithmic news feed 
based on user behavior as training data to algorithms.​38 
TikTok/Douyin was originally algorithmically moderating creative contents to personalize the 
recommendations on a large scale. The data were thus the fuel to train algorithms. Subsequently, the 
Good Samaritan gap between China and the US triggered America’s review of TikTok.​39​ One reason may 
be that in the beginning of the entry to the US market, the Good Samaritan gap was constituted between 
TikTok’s and Douyin’s ACM systems and the latter was shaped by the more stringent ACM built upon 
Chinese legislative packages relatively lacking in the articles encouraging voluntary moderation efforts. 
35 See Svea Windwehr and Jillian C. York, ‘Thank You For Your Transparency Report, Here’s Everything That’s Missing’ (Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, 13 October 2020) 
<​https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/10/thank-you-your-transparency-report-heres-everything-thats-missing​> accessed 30 October 
2020. 
36 See Facebook Community Standards at ​https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/​. 
37 See The Technology Policy Institute, ‘“TikTok Public Policy’s Michael Beckerman” (Two Think Minimum)’ (2020) 
<​https://techpolicyinstitute.org/2020/08/05/tiktok-public-policys-michael-beckerman-two-think-minimum/​> accessed 6 August 
2020. 
38 See Ben Thompson, ‘The TikTok War’ (Stratechery by Ben Thompson, 14 July 2020) 
<​https://stratechery.com/2020/the-tiktok-war/​> accessed 15 July 2020. 
39 See The White House, ‘Executive Order on Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok’ (The White House, 2020) 








In response to the doubts and questions, since 2019, TikTok has been building an internal “Jurisdictional 
Wall” to separate data, codes, and algorithms between jurisdictions.​40​ While strengthening data 
protection, TikTok’s data separation/localization policy constitutes a self-governance model on ACM – 
limiting overseas access to the domestic training data for moderating algorithms. And TikTok’s ACM 
reform has also released its transparency reports and induced the Transparency & Accountability Center 
(TAC), TikTok Content Advisory Council,​41​ and the “Zhong Tai”.​42​  Due to the global pandemic, the details 
of the TAC were less revealed, but the members in the Content Advisory Council have represented the 
diversity and inclusiveness of different stakeholders in the US. 
Der Standard Case Study 
ACM is not limited to large online platforms. The Austrian newspaper Der Standard (paid circulation app. 
56000, online visitors app. 35 million p.m.) runs a moderated online forum. Registered users comment on 
news articles and the moderators aim at an engaged and constructive discourse. They use two 
algorithmic support tools: the pre-moderation classification system ​Foromat​ trained to classify user 
comments in several categories, including hate speech, discrimination etc. The second system, the 
de-escalation bot​, aims to identify postings that have a positive influence on the discussion. 
The AI approach for classification in seven categories was developed and published by the Austrian 
Research Institute of Artificial Intelligence​43​.  
Der Standard uses algorithms mostly to deal with the large number of online content while maintaining 
quality of discourse. For the most part, the systems help human moderators to decide on posts that 
should not be published or not highlighted. However, the system is also capable of automatically 
removing content, e.g. duplicated entries. Format has been in use for more than 15 years.  
Typically, moderators will check the posts with the help of the algorithms before they go online. In case 
of deletion, users can check a counter that informs them about removed content. However, user posts 
can also be deleted without being inappropriate, e.g. when they replied to an unsuited post and the 
counter cannot currently distinguish such cases.  
Users can appeal the removal of their post by sending an email to a somewhat hidden address. The cases 
are then reviewed and the users receive a feedback email or their post is reinstated right away. Der 
Standard does not yet publish regular reports about deletions, complaints, or reinstantiations. During the 
COVID-19 crisis, it became impossible for the moderators to deal with appeals due to the increasing 
number of posts while staff was on short labour.  
 
 
40 The Technology Policy Institute (n 38). 
41 See Vanessa Pappas, ‘Introducing the TikTok Content Advisory Council’ (Newsroom | TikTok, 16 August 2019) 
<​https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/introducing-the-tiktok-content-advisory-council​> accessed 2 October 2020. 
42 “Zhong Tai”, or “中台” in Chinese, is a technical and business jargon that roughly means anything sandwiched between a tech 
company's front-end and back-end. See Chen Du, ‘ByteDance Cuts Domestic Engineers’ Data Access to TikTok, Other Overseas 
Products’ (PingWest, 2020) <​https://en.pingwest.com/a/6875​> accessed 14 June 2020. 
43 See Dietmar Schabus and others, ‘One Million Posts: A Data Set of German Online Discussions’ in Proceedings of the 40th 
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